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INTRODUCTION

Abigail Burroughs was a young college student who tragically developed headand-neck cancer.' When standard therapies were ineffective, she sought early access
to two investigational drugs the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") had not
yet approved. 2 Because she was ineligible for clinical trials, however, and the drug
manufacturers refused to include her in their compassionate-access programs,
Abigail died at age twenty-one.' The FDA later approved one of the drugs for headand-neck cancer, and Abigail's father remains convinced that he would not have lost
his daughter if she could have had access to the drug.4 He became an advocate for
early access to experimental treatment for the terminally ill and went on to found
The Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs ("Abigail
Alliance").s The group eventually brought a federal suit claiming that terminally ill
patients have a constitutional right to try non-FDA approved experimental
treatments in their efforts to preserve their lives. The D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc,
disagreed. 6 The D.C. Circuit noted that its decision need not be the end of the
discussion, but that Abigail Alliance's "arguments about morality, quality of life, and
acceptable levels of medical risk are certainly ones that can be aired in the democratic
branches, without injecting the courts into unknown questions of science and
medicine."7
Supporters of this "right-to-try" movement took the court's recommendation to
heart and began lobbying Congress to pass such legislation. But while several bills
were introduced, none were passed.' Right-to-try advocates, bolstered by help from
the Goldwater Institute, began focusing their lobbying efforts on state legislatures,
with great success. Since 2014, more than thirty states have passed right-to-try
legislation, with almost all the remaining states' legislatures having introduced such
bills, including Kentucky.'
This Note looks at right-to-try statutes and argues that not only do they have
hidden costs which are generally not discussed by their supporters, but that these
statutes are ultimately ineffective in increasing early access. Part I gives an overview
of the FDA new drug approval process and the early access exceptions for the
1 Rebecca Dresser, The Wight to Ty" InvesoationalDrugs: Science and Stories in the Access
Debate, 93 TEx. L. REv. 1631, 1648 (2015).
2Id.
3

Id.

4Id.; see also ABIGAIL ALLIANCE, http://www.abigail-alliance.org [https-//perma.cc/SSN3-YYA2]

(last visited Mar. 26, 2017).
Our Story, ABIGAIL ALLIANCE, http-//www.abigail-alliance.org [https://perma.cc/JH3B-6Q7C]
(last visited Mar. 26, 2017).
6
Id. at 710-11.
Id. at 713.
' The latest federal right-to-try bill was introduced in the Senate on May 10, 2016. Trickett Wendler
Right to Try Act of 2016, S. 2912, 114th Cong. (2016).
9

Right

to

Try

in

Your

Stat4

RIGHT

TO

TRY,

http-//righttotry.org/in-your-state/

[https://perma.cc/S74V-94P3] (last visited Mar. 26, 2017) (maintaining a current list of states where
legislation has passed or bills have been introduced).
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terminally ill. It then analyzes the Goldwater Institute's model legislation upon
which most state statutes are based and discusses the ways states have altered the
model legislation in their own right-to-try statutes. Part II analyzes the statutes using
a cost benefit method and then looks to the underlying assumptions of right-to-try
laws. Finally, Part III argues that because these laws are ultimately an ineffective
means of supporting the terminally ill, Kentucky should reject the proposed rightto-try legislation and instead, should focus its attention on measures designed to help
terminally ill patients determine and achieve their own personal treatment goals.
I. EARLY ACCESS: FDA REGULATIONS V. STATE RIGHT-TO-TRY STATUTES
The debate surrounding right-to-try legislation centers on the tension between
individual patient autonomy and the government's desire to protect its citizens from
unsafe drugs through regulation. Manufacturers must first submit a new drug to
rigorous testing and gain approval from the FDA before the drug can be placed on
the market. The FDA, however, provides a means by which terminally ill patients
may obtain treatments that have not yet gained approval through its early access
programs. State right-to-try legislation proposes a shortcut around the FDA,
attempting to create a right of early access to unapproved therapies for the terminally
ill that is outside of the FDA regulatory structure.
A. FDA DrugRegulation and Approved Methods ofEarlyAccess
Before any new drug can be marketed, it undergoes extensive testing to determine
both its safety and efficacy. First, a manufacturer must obtain an Investigational New
Drug exemption from the FDA, allowing the drug to be shipped in interstate
commerce for testing purposes.'o The drug then undergoes three phases of clinical
testing." Phase I testing is highly controlled with a limited number of participants,
allowing researchers to determine "reasonably safe" maximum dosages.12 Phase II
trials are open to a larger number of participants and have less narrow eligibility
requirements.' While Phase II trials are primarily devoted to demonstrating an
investigational drug's efficacy, researchers must also continue to show that the drug
is reasonably safe.' 4 If researchers can show that an investigational drug's potential
5
risks are less than its potential benefits, the drug advances to Phase III testing.' Only
if the drug is shown to be an effective treatment with an acceptable risk of side effects
can the manufacturer petition for approval to market the drug. 16 Very few
investigational drugs are granted FDA approval. About 30% of new investigational
§§ 312.1, 312.20 (2017); Dresser, supra note 1, at 1633.
§ 312.21 (2017); Dresser, supra note 1, at 1634.
§ 31221; Dresser, supra note 1, at 1634.
§ 312.21; see Dresser, supra note 1, at 1634.
§ 312.21; Dresser, supra note 1, at 1634.
Is 21 C.F.R. § 312.21; Dresser, supra note 1, at 1634.
16 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.2, 314.50 (2017); Dresser, supra note 1, at 1634.

10 21
"21
"21
13 21
14 21

C.F.R.
C.F.R.
C.F.R.
C.F.R.
C.F.R.
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drugs are eliminated during Phase I testing for safety reasons." Only about one-third
successfully pass both Phase I and I*1

'

Patients with serious illnesses can gain early access to investigational drugs
through clinical trials or through the FDA's expanded access program." However,
clinical trials are tightly controlled, and many terminally ill patients are therefore not
eligible to participate. 0 Through the expanded access program, individual access to
an unapproved drug may be granted if the patient has a serious or life-threatening
condition for which there are no comparable alternative treatments. 2 1A terminally
ill patient, however, must first find a physician who is willing to administer the
treatment and must gain approval from an Institutional Review Board.
Additionally, the patient needs an FDA determination that the benefits of treatment
outweigh the associated risks and that the patient's use will not negatively interfere
with any clinical trials?' During treatment, the manufacturer or the physician must
report any adverse effects and also provide a written summary of any treatment
results.
Critics claim that FDA regulations are overly burdensome?-5 FDA review times,
however, have "decreased considerably and are now similar to or better than those in
most industrialized countries."2 Of the nearly 1,000 requests for early access each
year, the FDA approves 99% of them. 27 Additionally, in February 2015, the FDA
introduced a "new, simplified" early access application that is estimated to take only
forty-five minutes to complete, significantly less than "the 100 hours required to
complete a[n] ... [Investigational New Drug] application."8

17Id

"s Id. at 1635.
19 21 C.F.R §§ 31221, 312300-.320 (2017); Elizabeth Richardson, HealthPolicyBriefRght-toTry
Laws,
HEALTH
AFF.,
Mar.
5,
2015,
at
1,
1,
http//healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief pdfs/healthpolicybriefl35.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8WQN-2LD2].
' Id. at 1-2 (describing the tight regulation of the clinical research process).
2121 C.F.R §§ 312.305-310 (2017); Richardson, supra note 19, at 2.
- 21 C.F.R §§ 312.305-.310; Richardson, supra note 19, at 2.
2 21 C.F.R §§ 312.305-310; Richardson, supra note 19, at 2.
24 21 C.F.R §§ 312.305-310; Richardson, supra
note 19, at 2.
' See, e.g., Goldwater Inst., Dead on Arrial. Federal "CompassionateUse"Leaves Little Hope for
Dying Patients, RIGHT TO TRY (Feb. 24, 2016), http-//righttotry.org/dead-on-arrival/
[https://perma.cc/SGE2-NL3X] (stating that current regulatory scheme is an 'unworkable system ...
strip[ping] dying patients of their final option to save their own lives").
26
Jonathan J. Darrow et al., Practical,Lego, andEhicalIssuesinExpandedAccess to Investigational
Drugs,
372 NEw ENG. J. MED. 279,284 (2015).
27
Julie A. Jacob, Questions ofSafety and FairnessRaised as Rght-to-Try Movement Gains Steam,
314 JAMA 758, 758 (2015).
28 Richardson, supra note 19, at 5.
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B. Bypassing the FDA: The GoldwaterInstitute's Model Legislationand
Its Vaiations in State Right-to- Try Statutes
Despite the continued streamlining of the FDA approval process, many states
have concluded that the process for obtaining early access to investigational drugs
through the FDA is too long for those battling terminal illnesses. 29 Claiming that
these patients have a fundamental right to seek to preserve their lives, 30 more than
31
thirty states have enacted right-to-try legislation. Most states closely base their
32
right-to-try statutes on model legislation developed by the Goldwater Institute, a
3
conservative and libertarian think tank. The legislation purports to bypass FDA
regulations by creating a right of access for the terminally ill, allowing patients to
directly petition manufacturers for investigational drugs.3 4
i. Theme: The Goldwater Institute's Model Legislation
Overwhelmingly, states have adopted the Goldwater Institute's model legislation
with slight variations. In some instances, states have adopted the model legislation
with very little revision. 3 s Michigan, for example, changed the term "terminal illness"
to "advanced illness," but otherwise adopted the model legislation verbatimincluding keeping "food and drug administration" and "medicare" in the lower
case. 6While the relationship between the Goldwater Institute's model and the state
legislature is not quite so explicit, the Goldwater Institute's model is clearly the
foundational document for many states' right-to-try legislation.

.

' See Right to Try in Your State, supra note 9 (showing the number of states that have passed and
introduced "Right to Try laws").
0 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-15-2102(4) (2016) ("[P]atients who have a terminal disease have
a fundamental right to attempt to pursue the preservation of their own lives . .
31 Rght to Try in Your State supra note 9.
32 Compare, e.g., Rght to Ty Model Legislation, GOLDWATER INST., https://goldwatermedia.s3.amazonaws.com/cms-page-media/2015/1/28/RIGHT%20TO%20TRY%20MODEL%20LE
GISLATION%20%282%29_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MM9-U2WD] (last visited Mar. 26, 2017)
(setting out standard provisions for right-to-try legislation), with COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 25-45-101 to
25-45-108 (2016) (providing nearly identical language to the model legislation throughout the series of
statutes), FLA. STAT. ANN. § 499.0295 (LexisNexis 2016) (providing nearly identical language to the
model legislation), andMICH. COMP. LAWS SERv. §§ 333.26451-.26457 (LexisNexis 2016) (providing
nearly identical language to the model legislation throughout the series of statutes).
33
About,
GOLDWATER
INST.,
http://www.goldwaterinstitute.org/en/about/
[https://perma.cc/6J2N-4PQW] (last visited Mar. 26, 2017).
34 See Why We NeedRight to Try.AboutRightto Try RIGHTTO TRY, http://righttotry.org/aboutright-to-try/ [https://perma.cc/7P2T-VY2J] (last visited Mar. 26, 2017) ("Right To Try is needed
because you shouldn't have to ask the federal government for permission to try to save your own life.");
FAQ RIGHT TO TRY, http-//righttotry.org/faq/ [https://perma.cc/6UDA-ZZV3] (last visited Mar. 26,
2017).
* See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
36 CompareRght to TyModelLegislation,supra note 32, § 1.(2)(a)-(c), with MiCH. COMP. LAWS
SERV. §§ 333.26451, 333.26455.
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The model legislation gives an eligible patient with a terminal illness a right to
request access to an "investigational drug, biological product, or device" upon the
patient's written informed consent." To be eligible, a patient must: (1) have a
"terminal illness, attested to by the patient's treating physician," (2) have considered
all other FDA-approved treatments, (3) receive a recommendation from a physician
for the investigational drug, (4) give written informed consent to the treatment, and
(5) have documentation from the physician certifying the patient's eligibility." The
terminal illness must be an irreversible "progressive disease or medical or surgical
condition" that causes "significant functional impairment . . [and] will soon result
in death. 39 Only investigational drugs that have passed the FDA's Phase I testing
and are currently in an FDA-approved clinical trial are permitted for use under the
statute."
The Goldwater Institute model provides minimum standards for the contents of
a patient's written informed consent. First, there must be an explanation of currently
approved treatments for the patient's terminal illness.4 ' The patient and physician
must agree that none of these approved treatments will be likely to prolong the
patient's life. 42 The specific treatment sought, whether drug, biological product, or
device, must be dearly identified, and the best and worst outcomes, as well as a
description of the most likely outcome must be described. 43 This includes the
possibility that the treatment may produce unexpected results that could worsen the
patient's condition or even lead to death." Because of the investigational nature of
the treatment, the description of possible outcomes is based upon the physician's
knowledge of the treatment and the patient's illness.4 5 Finally, the consent must also
include statements that the patient's health insurer is not obligated to pay for the
treatment or for any effects resulting from the treatment, that a "patient's eligibility
for hospice care may be withdrawn" subsequent to treatment, and "that the patient
understands that he or she [and his or her estate] is liable for all [treatment-related]
expenses.""
The model legislation has a series of provisions that allow, but do not require, a
manufacturer to make the drug, biological product, or device available either for free
or in exchange for a patient's payment of the costs associated with manufacturing the
drug. 47 Similarly, health insurers "may, but [are] not required to, provide coverage"
for the treatment.4 However, the model legislation expressly "does not affect any
" Rightto Try Model Legislation, supra note 32, §§ 1.(2)(b), 2.(1).
1Id. § 1.(2)(b).
3 Id. § 1.(2)(a).
I Id.§ 1.(2)(c).
41 Id. § 1.(2)(d)(i).
42 Id. § 1.(2)(d)(ii).
43 Id. § 1.(2)(d)(iii)-(iv).
4 Id. § 1.(2)(d)(iv).
3

45

Id.

6Id. § 1.(2)(d)(vHvii).
4 Id. § 2.(1)-(2).
4Id. § 3.(1)-(2).
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49
mandatory ... coverage for participation in clinical trials." Government payment
of any costs for treatment are not required, nor are hospitals or facilities required "to
50
provide new or additional services" for patients seeking investigational treatments.
Under the model legislation, if a patient dies during treatment, that patient's heirs
are free from liability for any outstanding debt related to the treatment.s'
Finally, a provider's license or Medicare certification may not be revoked, nor
may a provider be disciplined on account of recommending investigational
treatment.5 2 In fact, officials, employees, and agents of the state are forbidden to
53
block or attempt to block access to such treatment. However, a licensed health care
provider's "[c]ounseling, advice, or . . . recommendation consistent with medical
54
standards of care" does not violate this provision. Manufacturers and "any other
person or entity involved in the care of an eligible patient using [an] investigational
drug" are immune from liability for negative treatment outcomes, provided they
"comply[] in good faith with the [provisions] of [the] act and . . . exercise[]
55
reasonable care."

ii. The Variations: State Right-to-Try Statutes
While the Goldwater Institute's model served as a first draft for the majority of
state right-to-try statutes, many states made significant modifications to certain
provisions in the model legislation. These revisions most often occurred in the
definitions of eligible patient and written informed consent, as well as in the
provisions regarding payment for the experimental drug, standards of liability, and
the reporting of adverse treatment reactions.
The definition of an eligible patient is one of the most commonly revised
provisions in states' right-to-try statutes. Some states have lowered eligibility
requirements, effectively broadening the number of patients granted a right of access
to treatment. For example, Utah's only requirement for eligibility is that the patient
has a terminal illness. s6 Other states have expanded eligibility by re-defining
"terminal illness." Almost ten states define terminal illness to include permanent
unconsciousness." Others have more expressly defined terminal illness by creating a
time frame within which death is likely to occur. In Illinois, a terminal illness is one

Id. § 7.(2).
so Id. § 3.(3)-(4).
51 Id. § 4.
52
Id. § 5.
5 Id. § 6.
4

54

Id.

ss Id. § 7.(1).
56 UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-85-102 (LexisNexis 2016).
5 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-1311(4) (LexisNexis 2016); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-45-103(3) (2016);
LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1169.3(3) (2016); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126-Z:1 (LexisNexis 2016); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 23-48-01(3) (2016); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3091.2(3) (West 2016); TEx. HEALTH
&SAFETY CODE ANN. § 489.001(2) (West 2015); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-7-1802(a)(iii) (2016).

692

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 105

that can be reasonably expected to cause death within twenty-four months." In
Nevada, it's one year." But other states have omitted any time requirement.' In
defining a patient's eligibility, a few states include a balancing test, much like the one
used in the FDA's compassionate use program, mandating that the risk of death be
greater than the risk of the experimental treatment.' Generally, these balancing test
provisions also require that no other comparable or satisfactory FDA-approved
treatment options be available. 62
While some states have expanded eligibility, others have limited it, adding
additional requirements. In light of the need for clinical trial participants, some states
require that eligible patients be unable to participate in a clinical trial for their
terminal illness within 100 miles of their home.' In Missouri, a patient only has to
consider all relevant clinical trials being held within the state." Other limitations
include requiring the patient to consider, in consultation with a physician, all other
treatment options (Minnesota), 6 s obtaining a second opinion (Florida), 6 and
denying eligibility to patients currently receiving inpatient treatment in a hospital
(Colorado, 67 Oklahoma,68 and North Dakota).6 9
Written informed consent is another provision in state right-to-try statutes that
often differs from the Goldwater Institute's model. Some states do not define
informed consent within the statute. 7 0Others require written informed consent that
is at least as comprehensive as that used in clinical trials.7 ' A few states do not require
a witness. 72 Statutes also differ in the amount and types of treatment outcomesboth positive and negative-that must be disclosed. While the model legislation
requires a description of the "potentially best and worst outcomes,"' in Utah, a
doctor is required to "describe[] the possible positive and negative outcomes,"
5410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 649/10(5) (LexisNexis 2016).
' NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 454.690(5)(c) (LexisNexis 2016).
6 See, e.g., S.D. CODIFED LAws § 34-51-1(1) (2017).
1 ARIz. REV. STAT. § 36-1311(1)(b); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-15-2104(2) (2016); LA. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1169.3(1)(b); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-85-102(6)(a)(1).
62 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-1311(1)(b); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-15-2104(2); LA. STAT. ANN. §
40:1169.3(1)(b). Interestingly, Utah uses this provision to define terminal illness, not patient eligibility.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-85-102(6)(b).
3 Se, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-15-2104(3); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-45-103(1)(III) (2016);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-48-01(1)(a)(3) (2016); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3091.2(1)(c) (2016).
" Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.480(1)(1)(b) (West 2016).
6s MINN. STAT. ANN. § 151.375(3)(2) (West 2017).
- FLA. STAT. ANN. § 499.0295(2)(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2016).
67 COLO. REv. STAT. § 25-45-103(1)(b).
61 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 30912(1).
69 N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-48-01(1)(b) (2016).
70 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-1311 (LexisNexis 2016); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
649/10
(LexisNexis 2016); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 35-7-1802 (2016).
71 E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.480(1)(1)(d) (West 2016).
n See, eg., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 499.0295(2)(e) (LexisNexis 2016); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
151375(3) (West 2017). But see Right to TryModelLegislation, supra note 32, § 1(d) ('Written,
informed consent' means a written document signed by the patient . .. and attested to by the patient's
physician and a witness . . .").

7' Rh

tto Try Model Lqgislation, supra note 32, § 1(d).
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including any increased risk of death.74 South Dakota generalizes this provision
further, merely requiring a doctor to explain "potential outcomes" of treatment. 7s In
Florida, however, a doctor need only provide "[a] realistic description of the most
likely outcomes."76
As in the model legislation, almost all states allow a manufacturer to charge
patients for treatment. 7 7 Texas, alone, prohibits a manufacturer from receiving
compensation for providing an experimental drug to an eligible patient.7 ' But a few
states attempt to limit the costs to patients for treatment. Arkansas does this by
allowing a manufacturer to charge patients only for "actual out-of-pocket costs
incurred in providing the investigational drug, biological product, or device to the
patient in the specific case." 79 Other states include the model legislation's provision
that excuses a patient's heirs' from liability for any outstanding treatment-related
debt if the patient dies during treatment. 0 But the debt-cancelling provision is one
of the most commonly deleted provisions in the model legislation.s"
Defining the limits of liability for experimental treatment is another area where
states often diverge from the model legislation. Most states provide some protection
for manufacturers and health care providers, so long as the treatment complies with
good faith and reasonable care." But the standard of care varies, with some states
not explicitly requiring reasonable care, 8 and others changing the standard to "gross
negligence."" Indiana's statute only protects manufacturers and not health care
providers,8 while Louisiana's statute only provides immunity for physicians." Texas
is silent on any standard of care, excluding a private right of action for "any harm
done to the eligible patient resulting from the investigational drug, biological
product, or device."D Arizona's statute has no provision excluding a private right of

74 UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 58-85-103(3)(a) (LexisNexis 2016).

7 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-51-3(4) (2017).
76 FLA. STAT. ANN.
499.0295(2)(e)(4) (LexisNexis 2016).

§

n See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
7
TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 489.053(c) (West 2015).
7 ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-15-2106(a)(2)(B) (2016).

a Compare, e.g., Right to TryModel Legislation, supra note 32, § 4, with COLO. REv. STAT. § 2545-104(4) (2016), FLA. STAT. ANN. § 499.0295(6) (LexisNexis 2016), andMICH. COMP. LAWS SERV.
§ 333.26454 (LexisNexis 2016).
s See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. §§ 36-1311 to -1314 (LexisNexis 2016); LA. STAT. ANN. §§
40:1169.1-11693 (2016); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 151.375 (West 2017); Mo. ANN. STAT. §191.480 (West
2016); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-85-101 to -105 (LcxisNexis 2016); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-7-1801
to -1806 (2016).
'2 See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 25-45-107; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 499.0295(8); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 23-48-05 (2016); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit 63, § 3091.6 (West 2016).
8 See, e.g., WYo. STAT. ANN. § 35-7-1806 (requiring only "good faith" medical treatment).
- See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-15-2110(a) (granting immunity from civil liability for
experimental treatment provided in good faith except in cases of "gross negligence or wilifu misconduct").

s IND. CODE ANN. § 16-42-26-5 (LexisNexis 2016).
* LA. STAT. ANN.

§ 40:1169.5(A)

(granting broad immunity to physicians for "any adverse action,

condition, or other outcome resulting from the patient's use of the investigational drug, biological product,
or device").
8 TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 489.054 (West 2015).
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action for experimental treatment." Utah takes a completely different approach;
instead of limiting liability for harm resulting from experimental treatment, Utah's
statute protects physicians and hospitals from liability for refusing to administer
experimental treatment. 9 Similarly, it protects manufacturers from liability for
refusing to provide patients with experimental drugs or devices."
Variations on the model legislation's provision prohibiting official attempts to
block access to experimental treatments generally follow one of three forms. Most
commonly, states either follow the wording of the model legislation91 or remain
entirely silent on the issue. 92 A few states not only prohibit any attempt to block
patient access to experimental treatment, but also have defined such attempts as
misdemeanors. 9 Almost all states temper any potential liability from these
provisions by expressly stating that counseling, advice, or medical recommendations
do not violate the statute.9' Interestingly, however, in states where attempts to block
access are considered misdemeanors, there is no statutory carve out for this type of
medical advice." But several states, following language in the model legislation, do
not require hospitals or medical facilities to provide new or additional services to
comply with the statute.9' Some extend this protection to physicians.'
Only a few states require collaborative reporting between the manufacturer and
the patient. Arizona explicitly allows a manufacturer to require a patient to
participate in data collection in order to gain access to its investigational drugs."
Tennessee requires a patient's physician to notify the manufacturer the patient's
adverse responses to the treatment." Missouri requires a manufacturer to notify a
patient if the treatment is found to be unsafe in any trial.xoo
Thus, while there are several variations among the states, particularly in defining
an eligible patient and informed consent, the Goldwater Institute's model underlies
8 ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 36-1311 to -1314 (LexisNexis 2016).
8 UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-85-104(3)(c)(i) (LexisNexis 2016).
* Id. § 58-85-104(3)(c)(ii).
91 Compare, e.g., Right to TryModelLegislaion,supra note 32, § 6, with COLO. REV. STAT. § 2545-106 (2016), MICH. COMP. LAws SERV. § 333.26456 (LexisNexis 2016), N.D. CENT. CODE § 2348-04 (2016), andTENN. CODE ANN. § 63-6-307 (2016).
92 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-15-2101 to 20-15-2111 (2016); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 499.0295
(LexisNexis 2016); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 151.375 (West 2017); MO. ANN. STAT. § 191.480 (West
2016).
9

ARiz. REv. STAT. § 36-1314; 410 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 649/25 (LexisNexis 2016); NEv. REV.

STAT. ANN. § 454.690(3)-(4) (LexisNexis 2016).
94 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-45-106; MICH. COMP. LAws SERV. § 33326456; N.D. CENT.
CODE § 23-48-04; TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-6-307.
1s ARiz. REV. STAT. § 36-1314; 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 649/25; NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. §
454.690.
' Compare, e.g., Right to Try Model Leislation, supra note 32, § 3(4), with ARI CODE ANN. §
20-15-2110(b)-(c), FLA. STAT. ANN. § 499.0295(5), MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 333.26453(4), and
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-12-106(1)(d) (West 2017).
97
ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-15-2110(b).
- ARIz. REv. STAT. § 36-1312(B)(3).
9 TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-6-309.
I0 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.480(7) (West 2016).
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most state right-to-try legislation. These states hope that this legislation will bypass
the FDA's regulatory structure, granting terminally ill patients the right to directly
petition manufacturers and ultimately increasing access to experimental treatment.
II. AN ANALYSIS OF STATE RIGHT-TO-TRY STATUTES
Because state right-to-try legislation ostensibly only defines a ight of early
access, it is often seen as a no-cost solution to aid the terminally ill in their quest for
potentially life-saving treatment options. A more nuanced analysis, however, shows
that there are many costs inherent in these laws: costs to public health, drug
manufacturers, doctors, and even to the patients themselves. Furthermore, looking
deeper to the underlying assumptions of right-to-try legislation shows that many of
these assumptions are false, making the laws themselves ineffective in actually
providing early access for the terminally ill.
A. Costs and Benefits ofState Right-to-Try Legislation
In analyzing right-to-try legislation, examining the costs and benefits of the laws
can create a framework for determining whether early access legislation is an
appropriate means of supporting the terminally ill. There are no explicit costs
associated with right-to-try legislation, and thus a state would not need to generate
additional tax revenues. But there are implicit costs-financial or otherwise-to
society, drug manufacturers, physicians, and patients. By balancing these costs with
the potential benefits derived from the statutes, states can more accurately assess
right-to-try legislation.
The primary beneficiaries of right-to-try legislation, of course, are terminally ill
patients and their loved ones. It must be emphasized, though, that the benefit of
right-to-try legislation is not an actualcure or life sustaining treatment. It is merely
0
But a correlated
the chance of one. Put more simply, the primary benefit is hope.o
102
According
individual.
as
an
autonomous
of
acting
the
dignity
patients
is
benefit to
to
take the
ability
the
individual
a
competent
deny
to this view, society should not
03
certainty.'
a
otherwise
is
death
when
treatment
risks inherent in experimental
Patients should have the freedom to balance the known risks of their condition with
the potential risks and benefits of experimental treatments.'1 Some have even argued

101 See Why We Need Right to Tr About Right to Try, supra note 34 ("Right to Try gives lifesaving hope back to those who've lost it.").
102 See Udo Schiiklenk & Christopher Lowry, Terminal llness andAccess to Phase1 Experimental
Agents, Surgeries and Devices: Reviewing the EthicalArguments, 89 BRIT. MED. BULL., Mar. 2009, at
7, 10-12, https://academic.oup.com/bmb/article/89/1/7/359991aferminal-illness-and-access-to-Phase1 (follow "PDF" hyperlink) [https://perma.cc/7X8S-FU8j].
10 See id. at 11.

104

See id.
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that access to experimental treatment is a form of medical self-defense that should
be recognized as a constitutional right.'os
This hope for a cure is offset by costs to public health, drug manufacturers,
physicians, medical facilities, and even the patients themselves. Patient access to
experimental treatment has the potential to reduce participation in the research
necessary for these treatments to gain FDA approval and become available to the
general public.'" Because Phase II and Phase III testing require large numbers of
people to demonstrate a treatment's efficacy, allowing individuals early access could
potentially slow down-or for rare conditions, even block-the completion of FDA
testing.' 7 Likewise, because many states' right-to-try statutes have no reporting
requirements, the adverse side effects of experimental treatments will take longer to
be recognized.' Some states have addressed this issue by defining eligible patients
as those who have been unable to participate in a clinical trial within 100 miles of
their home.'" Others require reporting of adverse side effects (or general reporting)
to the manufacturer.' 10 Even with these reporting requirements, because there is
often no control group when patients receive early access, it would be difficult to
determine a treatment's efficacy. 1 ' Without understanding a treatment's efficacy, it
is impossible to balance the risks inherent in the treatment.112
While the ability to bypass FDA regulations and sell directly to customers may
appear to provide only financial gain to manufacturers, it also brings several potential
costs. The most obvious of these costs-liability for adverse reactions to treatmentis mitigated by an express grant of immunity in almost all state statutes."' But legal
liability is not the only cost manufacturers face. Because of the ubiquitous reach of
social media, an adverse reaction to an experimental treatment-or even a denial of
a patient's request for access to treatment-can have serious financial effects on a
manufacturer." 4 For example, after initially denying a 7-year-old cancer patient's
"osSee Eugene Volokh, MedicalSelf-Defense, ProhibitedExperimentalTherapies, andPaymentfor
Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1816-17, 1824, 1826-27 (2007); see also FAQ supra note 34 (stating
that "FDA regulations cannot preempt state laws that preserve constitutionally protected rights, such as
the fundamental right to life and medical self-preservation").
"nSee Darrow et al., supra note 26, at 284.
107 Schiiklenk & Lowry, supra note 102, at 16-17.
See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
1 See, eg., supra note 63 and accompanying text.
no See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-6-309 (2016).
"' See Susan Okie, Access BeforeApproval-A Right to Take ExperimentalDrigs?355 NEw ENG.
J.
MED.
437,
437
(2006),
http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMp068132
[https-//perma.cc/75UG-RHYZ].
"nSee Schiildenk &Lowry, supra note 102, at 17. For example, breast cancer treatment with highdose chemotherapy and bone marrow transplant was widely available before definitive trials were
conducted. Id. The treatment ultimately proved ineffective but not before "tens of thousands of women"
were subjected to the burdens and risks of the treatment, resulting in "an avoidable surplus of life-years
lost." Id.
13 See, eg., COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-45-107 (2016); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 499.0295(8) (LexisNexis
2016); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-48-05 (2016); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit 63, § 3091.6 (West 2016).
S"Vicki G. Norton, How Drug Cos. Can Minimize Risks of Wight to Try'Laws, LAW360 (June
30,
2015,
12:02
PM),
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request for early access, Chimerix, Inc. was subjected to a negative social media
campaign, eventually leading to the CEO's resignation. 1 ' Chimerix eventually
reconsidered and after the boy was successfully treated, the ensuing positive social
6
media coverage led to a fifty percent increase in Chimerix stock"' When a different
patient died while undergoing the same treatment, however, Chimerix stock fell by
fifteen percent."' For small companies in particular, these potential financial swings
could be disastrous, creating a chilling effect on manufacturers' willingness to provide
experimental drugs to terminally ill patients.
For physicians and medical facilities, right-to-try legislation comes with two
potential financial costs: liability from adverse reactions to experimental treatment
and from allegations of blocking access to experimental treatments. First, because of
the lack of information available regarding the effects of experimental treatments,
physicians face a difficult challenge in weighing the risks and benefits of treatment.'
Manufacturer's clinical information is proprietary, and thus, physicians can only gain
119
To say the least, this creates
access to it at the discretion of the manufacturer.
difficulties for physicians to determine possible outcomes or even realistic outcomes
of experimental treatment. 1 2 0 While many right-to-try statutes limit a physician or
medical facility's liability for a patient's adverse reactions to experimental treatments,
if adverse reactions occur, it is likely that physicians and facilities will face the same
risk of financial loss from negative media attention as manufacturers. Second,
physicians may also face liability from accusations of blocking patient access to
experimental treatment. Generally, state provisions prohibiting actions that block
access to investigational drugs exclude normal physician-patient counseling.121 But if
a patient is adamant in desiring experimental treatment, how certain must the
negative effects of that treatment be for a physician to escape a charge of blocking a
patient from access? While several states did not enact this provision of the model
legislation, 122 others not only included it, but made any attempt at blocking access to
experimental treatment a misdemeanor.123
These blocking provisions can lead to an ethical dilemma for physicians, who are
called to "do no harm." If a physician believes that the risk of side effects is greater
than any potential benefit, is it ethical for the physician to prescribe the experimental
treatment? Considering that "the probability of clinically meaningful benefit from

https://wwwlaw360.com/articles/673014/howdrugcoscanminimizerisksofrighttotrylaws
[https-//perma.cc/T5A6-5KME].
115id.

..sJacob, supra note 27, at 760.
n1 Darrow et al., supra note 26, at 282.
1 SeeJacob, supra note 27, at 760.

See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-45-106 (2016); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 333.26456
(LexisNexis 2016); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-48-04 (2016); TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-6-307 (2016).
" See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
m ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-1314 (LexisNexis 2016); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 649/25
(LexisNexis 2016); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 454.690(3H4) (West 2016).
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early-stage experimental trials may be less than 10%," this scenario, where the risk of
harm outweighs the potential benefits, is much more likely to be the norm than the
exception. 4 Generally, the goal of physicians is to keep patients alive and healthy.
But at the end of life, calculus of this decision may change. Right-to-try legislation
seems to tip the scale in favor of maintaining life at all costs and by any means. If
physicians fear being viewed as blocking access to experimental treatment, physicians
could be effectively discouraged from having necessary end-of-life discussions with
their terminally ill patients.
Right-to-try legislation also comes with costs for the terminally ill patients
themselves. Under right-to-try statutes, health insurance is not required to cover the
costs associated with treatment-which includes the treatment of any side effects.1 25
And while manufacturers mayprovide the drug free of charge, they are not required
to so."* If a manufacturer refuses to provide the experimental drug, it is unlikely to
be covered by a patient's insurance.1 27 Medicare and most private insurance only
cover costs for "reasonable and necessary" treatments and payment for an
experimental treatment will generally be denied.'" Many states have tried to mitigate
cost to patients by eliminating the patient's (and the patient's estate's) liability for
any outstanding debt related to treatment if death occurs. '2 Furthermore, under
many statutes, once treatment begins, hospice benefits are often terminated.130 This
essentially means that right-to-try legislation only expands access for those with the
means to pay, "generally favor[ing] the rich or well-connected over the poor."'31
Weighing these costs and benefits leads to no simple result. On the one hand,
the costs of right-to-try legislation primarily stem from potential liability for
manufacturers, physicians, and medical facilities; reduced participation in clinical
trials, leading to potentially worse public health outcomes; the cost burden patients
bear for treatment, and, the inherent inequity in access between rich and poor. These
are balanced against the terminally ill patient's autonomy in making medical
decisions and the hope for a cure or other life-sustaining treatment. Often, however,
this hope for a cure may be futile. But, "futility is in the eye of the beholder," and
patients may wish to try every available treatment-even if the chance of any
meaningful clinical benefit is less than ten percent. 13 2 This decision may be based

1 Darrow et al., supra note 26, at 284.
125 See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 25-45-104(3); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 499.0295(4) (LexisNexis 2016);
MICH. CoMP. LAws SERV. § 333.26453.
126 See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 25-45-104(1)-(2); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 499.0295(3); MICH.
CoMP. LAws SERV. § 333.26452(2).
" Darrow et al., supra note 26, at 284.
128 Seeid
129 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-15-2106(b) (2016).
m See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 25-45-103(4)(f); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 499.0295(2)(e)(6); MICH.
CoMP. LAWS SERV. § 333.26451(2)(d)(vi).
131 Darrow et al., supra note 26, at 284.
132
Barbara A. Noah, In Denial: The Role ofLawin Preparingfor Death, 21 ELDER L.J. 1, 14-15
(2013).
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more on "assuag[ing] feelings of helplessness" and less on a rational analysis of
treatment options. 33
This has led some observers to question terminally ill patients' ability to give
informed consent. In the context of clinical research trials, medical ethics researchers
have explored the process of informed consent for the terminally ill.'3 The findings
show that terminally ill patients tend to "overestimate[] their chances of experiencing
[clinical] benefit and underestimate[] their chances of experiencing harm."13 A
patient who experiences this "unrealistic optimism" in clinical trials can accurately
describe the clinical trial process-in which some participants are placed in the
control group and excluded from the treatment under investigation-and yet still
expect to receive therapeutic benefit for themselves. 3 In one survey, 69% of
respondents said a person should participate in a clinical trial to benefit society.137
But when asked why they personally would participate in a clinical trial, 52% of
respondents acknowledged they would do it to receive the best medical care.'
Like a gambler who understands the negligible odds of winning and yet believes
the next roll is his lucky roll, unrealistic optimism "interfere[s] with an individual's
ability to apply information, or to use the information she is given with
understanding.""' In essence, unrealistic optimism compromises a patient's ability
to make autonomous treatment choices because the patient is reasoning from false
beliefs. 14 This has led many to conclude it would be unethical to allow patients who
exhibit unrealistic optimism to participate in clinical trials.' 4' The same might be said
of patients asking for experimental treatments. If patients are overestimating the
probability of benefit and underestimating the probability of harm, their ability to
give informed consent is called into question. While this poses less of an ethical
dilemma than in clinical trials (because the patient is being treated, not being
experimented upon), it still creates a much murkier picture of a terminally ill patient's
ability to give informed consent for experimental treatment.
Thus, the two primary benefits to terminally ill patients of right-to-try
legislation-hope and autonomy-seem to be inflated by proponents of these laws.
When weighed against the various costs of the legislation, right-to-try laws are found
wanting.

Id. at 15.
See generaly Don Swekoski & Deborah Barnbaum, The Gamblers Fallacy, the Therapeutic
Msconception, and UnrealisticOptimism, IRB: ETHICS & HUM. RES., Mar.-Apr. 2013, at 1.
131 Id. at 1, 3.
136 Id. at 3.
131 Id. at 4.
13
133
1

8Id.

Id. at 1, 5.
0Joshua Crites & Eric Kodish, UnrealisticOptimism and the Ethics ofPhase I Cancer Research,
39 J. MED. ETHICS 403, 404 (2013).
141 See id. at 403-05; see also Swekoski & Barnbaum, supra note 134, at 1, 5.
131
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B. Assumptions UnderlyingState Rght-to- Try Statutes
Beyond the costs associated with right-to-try legislation, right-to-try statutes are
also incapable of substantively increasing a patient's likelihood ofgaining early access.
The legislation is ultimately ineffective because it is based on several false
assumptions. The first is that the FDA is the source of obstruction to early access.
The Right To Try website notes that the FDA only grants early access to about 1,000
patients a year. 42 It fails to mention that this represents an approval rate of 99% of
such requests.14 3 And while the website claims that right-to-try legislation helps
patients gain "immediate access" to treatment options, it fails to note that access is
contingent upon the manufacturer's consent to provide the treatment.'" Of the four
patients whose cases were described in the AbigailA&ance complaint, none offered
facts showing that FDA regulations kept them from obtaining treatment.' 45 There
are many reasons why manufacturers deny these early access requests. '4
Manufacturers often have limited supplies of investigational drugs, or they may be
concerned that offering the medications for early access will undermine their chance
of having the drug approved, whether through a reduced number of clinical trial
participants or because of adverse side effects in the terminally ill patient. 14' And, as
discussed above, manufacturers may be adversely affected by negative media
attention they receive if early access experimental treatment produces adverse
effects.' 8 In fact, because terminally ill patients are often sicker than those admitted
in clinical trials, they are more likely to experience negative outcomes than the
participants in Phase I trials. 4
The second false assumption of right-to-try legislation is that unapproved drugs
that have passed the FDA's Phase I testing are unquestionably safe. While Phase I
testing is primarily designed to determine maximum safe dosage levels, those trials
are extremely limited in scope and the participants are tightly screened. 5 Safety
continues to be tested in Phases II and III in larger clinical trials.151 Yet, most rightto-try laws seem to presume that safety is definitively determined by completion of
Phase I testing.' 52 As the court noted in Abigail Alance, simply because Phase I
142 FAQ supra note 34.

Jacob, supra note 27, at 758.
'" FAQ supra note 34; Okie, supra note 111, at 439.
14s Jerry Menikoff, Beyond Abigail Alliance: The Realty Behind the Right to Get Experimental
Drugs, 56 U. KAN. L. REv. 1045, 1058-60 (2008).
1" See Darrow et al., supra note 26, at 280-82.
147 Jacob, supra note 27, at
759.
14s Norton, supra note
114.
149 Alexandra Todak, Expansion of 'Right to Try' Lislation
Raises Ethical, Safety Concerns,
HEMONC TODAY (Apr. 25, 2015), http://www.healio.com/hematology-oncology/practicemanagement/news/print/hemonc-today/%7Bc801b6ee-318e-4fce-9dfa-a29c597028b9%7D/expansionof-right-to-try-legislation-raises-ethical-safety-concerns [httpsl//perma.cc/CZP4-LZ5JI.
1so See Dresser, supra note 1, at 1634.
1 Id.
152 See, e.g., FAQ supra note 34 (affirmatively answering that treatments available under Right to
Try laws are safe because they "have already passed the FDA's basic safety testing").
143
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testing determines that a drug is "safe for limited clinical testing in a controlled and
closely-monitored environment after detailed scrutiny of each trial participant does
not mean that a drug is safe for use beyond supervised trials."'
Finally, right-to-try legislation assumes that federal law will not preempt these
state laws. The Right to Try website claims that:
FDA regulations cannot preempt state laws that preserve
constitutionally protected rights, such as the fundamental right to
life and medical self-preservation. The United States Supreme
Court has never addressed Right To Try specifically, but it has
held that states have great latitude in regulating health and safety,
including medical standards, which are primarily and historically a
matter of local concern.1 54
While acknowledging that the Supreme Court has not addressed the right-to-try
issue, the website fails to mention that this issue has come up in federal court.'s In
AbigailAliance, the D.C. Circuit held that a right of access to experimental drugs
is not a fundamental constitutional right.1 6 And while the court noted that there
were no Supreme Court decisions directly on point, it supported its decision with
several related Supreme Court rulings.'s
Additionally, even if preemption were an open question, it is unlikely that
manufacturers would ignore federal regulations in favor of state right-to-try laws.
Shipping investigational drugs by means of interstate commerce without obtaining
FDA approval is illegal. 158 With so much time and money invested in an
investigational drug, manufacturers are unlikely to ignore this regulation if trying to
gain FDA approval.' 5 9 Because bypassing the FDA's regulatory structure is "against
[manufacturers'] self-interest," experts doubt that right-to-try legislation will
effectively increase public access to experimental treatment. 1so
Thus, because the assumptions underlying state right-to-try legislation are false,
the laws are ultimately ineffective. Combined with the many costs inherent in the
legislation, right-to-try laws are an inadequate means to support the terminally ill.

153 Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 706
(D.C. Cir. 2007).
14 FAQ supra note 34.
1s
See generallyAbigailAB. for BetterAccess to Developmental Drugs, 495 F.3d 695.
.s6 Id. at 711.
.s. Id. at 710-11 ("Although it has not addressed the precise constitutional argument urged by the
Alliance, we find it highly significant that the Supreme Court has rejected several similar challenges to
the FDCA and related laws brought on statutory grounds.").
1ss Richardson, supra note 19, at 4.
1s9

See Dresser, supra note 1, at 1647.

16o

Id. at 1646-47.
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III. KENTUCKY SHOULD REJECT RIGHT-TO-TRY
LEGISLATION AND INSTEAD PROVIDE EFFECTIVE MEANS FOR
ACHIEVING TERMINALLY ILL PATIENTS' TREATMENT GOALS

Ultimately, right-to-try legislation seems to be a form of political theater. It
seems to be more of a statement in support of limited government oversight and less
of a tool to help terminally ill patients fulfill their treatment goals. The purported
benefits of these statutes are questionable, and the laws do nothing to substantially
increase early access to experimental treatment for terminally ill patients. But because
these statutes are financially neutral, they allow state legislators to say they have "done
something" while sidestepping difficult ethical and moral questions surrounding
end-of-life issues, particularly regarding the terminally ill. While right-to-try statutes
may not impose a direct cost to the state, there are inherent costs in the legislationto public health, manufacturers, physicians, and patients-but with no real benefits.
For these reasons, Kentucky should reject the legislation.
There are, however, specific measures that Kentucky could take to support the
terminally ill in making autonomous treatment decisions. First, legislators should be
prepared to educate the public about the effects of early access and the costs of rightto-try legislation. Early access programs for terminally ill patients is inevitably an
emotionally charged discussion. 16 Therefore, legislators should be prepared to
discuss not only facts, but also stories from both sides of the debate. 16 2 To date, rightto-try proponents have controlled the creation of the narrative in the public
imagination, in which the FDA's "red tape and government regulations" deprive the
terminally ill of access to "potentially life-saving treatment."1 63 There are also stories
on the other side of the debate, however, in which early access to investigational
treatments leads not to "a longer and better life" but rather to "a painful and
distressing death."M These cautionary stories must also be told so that the terminally
ill and the public in general understand the magnitude of the decision to obtain
investigational treatments.
Second, Kentucky should work collaboratively with the FDA to help patients
who wish to obtain early access to experimental treatments. One concrete way to do
this is to create multi-center review boards that focus exclusively on expanded-access
requests.'s Because gaining approval from an independent review board is required
before a patient can begin treatment with an investigational drug, this can be a
significant barrier to early access, especially in smaller facilities that do not have their
own in-house review board.'" By limiting the multi-center review board to early

161 See id. at 1648 (noting that advocates often neglect to tell stories of patients who
had negative
experiences with investigational drugs).
162 See id. at 1656-57.

16 FAQ supra note 34.
16 Dresser, supra note 1, at 1650.
16s
166

Darrow et al., supra note 26, at 284.
See id. at 282.
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access requests, the review time of patient requests can be reduced. 16 7 Maintaining a
multi-center review board would require funding, but it would be a substantive and
effective means to increase access to experimental treatments for the terminally ill.
Finally, Kentucky should encourage physicians to have frank discussions with
their terminally ill patients about the patient's goals for medical treatment. As Dr.
Atul Gawande observes, "The seemingly easiest and most sensible rule for a doctor
to follow is: [a]lways [flight."' 68 And yet, he notes that to "always fight" does not
always mean doing more.' Weighing the potential benefits and risks of continued
treatments is an extremely personal determination, so physicians should take the time
to understand what it is their patients truly desire from their medical care. Is their
goal to live as long as possible even if their quality of life is reduced? Or is quality of
life more important than duration? Perhaps there is an important event in the near
future (a child's wedding, an anniversary) that they hope to attend. Physicians often
do not receive the training necessary to develop the communication skills required
for these end-of-life discussions. 170 Yet, it is only with this level of information that
a physician can help a patient understand the trade-offs inherent in different
treatment options and determine which one will be most effective in helping reach.
the patient's goals. For example, after Colorado passed its right-to-try legislation,
several ALS patients asked for experimental stem cell therapy. 17' But after
discussions with their doctors, all the patients decided to forego the treatment for
less expensive or more easily available options. 172
To help spark these discussions, a standardized end-of-life questionnaire could
be created that could be filled out as part of a patient's normal intake forms. This
questionnaire could be left in a patient's medical record and thus be accessible to any
treating physician. Not only would this allow physicians to more dearly understand
their patient's treatment goals, it could also serve as a non-threatening way to begin
end-of-life care discussions with patients and their families. The American Bar
Association's Commission on Law and Aging has developed a Consumer's Tool Kit
73
for Health Care Advance Planning that could easily be adapted for this purpose.'
While a simple intake form is by no means the best way for patients to evaluate their
treatment goals for end-of-life care, it can be an effective way to introduce the topic
in patient-physician discussions. Similarly, the National POLST (Physician Orders
for Life-Sustaining Treatment) Paradigm approaches end-of-life planning by
encouraging "thoughtful, facilitated advance care planning conversations" between
Id. at 284.
ATUL GAWANDE, BETTER- A SURGEON'S NOTES ON PERFORMANCE 161 (2007).
169 Id. at 164.
170 Charles F. von Gunten et al., Ensuring Competency in End-of-Life Care: Communication and
Relational Skills, 284 JAMA 3051, 3051 (2000).
171 Jacob, supra note 27, at 758.
172 Id.
167
16

173 See A.B.A.

COMM'N ON LAw & AGING, CONSUMER'S TOOL KIT FOR HEALTH CARE

ADVANCE
PLANNING
(2d.
ed.
2005),
too
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/lawaging/2011_aging-bk-consumer
1_kit bk.authcheckdam.pdf [https*//perma.cc/LBJ5-RBU7].
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patients, their families, and health care professionals, which a health care professional
then documents in a POLST form. 174 Kentucky's POLST program is still
developing,17 s but once completed, it could provide another avenue for promoting
end-of-life conversations between the terminally ill and their physicians.
By educating the public, working collaboratively with the FDA, and encouraging
physician-patient dialogue regarding end-of-life issues, Kentucky can ensure that the
terminally ill are given the chance to choose the most appropriate medical care to
meet their personal treatment goals.
CONCLUSION

Right-to-try legislation delivers only a false hope for the terminally ill. Because
it is based on faulty assumptions, right-to-try legislation cannot deliver expanded
access to the terminally ill It also comes with implicit costs for public health,
manufacturers, physicians, medical facilities, and the patients themselves. Kentucky
would do well to reject right-to-try legislation. However, this need not be a denial of
the plight of her terminally ill citizens. Encouraging physicians to have those difficult
end-of-life discussions with their patients can help patients more precisely define
their own treatment goals. For those patients that wish to try experimental
treatments, physicians can more effectively help them gain early access by working
within the existing federal regulatory structure. Instead of pushing a one-size-fits-all
approach to end-of-life care for the terminally ill, Kentucky has the chance to create
meaningfil avenues for terminally ill patients to make truly autonomous treatment
choices.
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